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The issue of constitutional comparativism has been a topic of significant
commentary in recent years. Given that there are literally thousands of
articles on the subject, one would have expected this subject matter to be
exhausted. 1 Despite extensive analysis, there is one aspect of this subject
that has been almost completely ignored by scholars: the reception, or lack
thereof, of constitutional comparativism by state and lower federal courts.
In Roper v. Simmons, the U.S. Supreme Court warmly embraced the use
of international and foreign sources in interpreting the Constitution. 2 The
Court concluded that "[t]he opinion of the world community, while not
controlling our outcome, does provide respected and significant
confirmation for our own conclusions." 3  If such opinions purportedly
provide respected and significant confirmation, it could logically be
expected that state and federal courts would follow the Supreme Court's
lead and share in the embrace. However, they most decidedly have not. In
fact, if one were to identify the single most important development in
constitutional comparativism since Roper was decided on March 1, 2005, it
would be the story of what has not happened; the story of over three years
of neglect, indifference, and detachment. This essay briefly summarizes the
unappreciated tale of how state and federal courts have declined the
Supreme Court's invitation to rely on international and comparative
material to decide constitutional cases. The response of lower courts to
* Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law. I gratefully acknowledge the
help of research assistant Jake Nare and research librarian Jennifer Allison. This essay was
supported by a generous grant from Pepperdine University School of Law.
1. A search in Westlaw's JLR (i.e., "journals and law reviews") database for "Roper v.
Simmons" or "Lawrence v. Texas" and either "international," "foreign," or "comparative,"
returned over 3000 articles.
2. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575-78 (2005) (discussing the laws of other
countries and international authorities as "instructive" in deciding that execution of an
individual who was younger than eighteen when he committed a capital crime is a violation
of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments). In Roper, the "Supreme Court spent perhaps 20
percent of its legal analysis discussing the laws of Great Britain, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Iran,
Nigeria and China." Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to Be
an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 370 (2006).
3. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
these overtures could be described using an anthropomorphism rather
simply: "We're just not that into you."
This is not how advocates of constitutional comparativism thought the
plot line would advance. The plan, developed by "an emerging vanguardist
intellectual movement," was to transform American constitutional law and
its interpretation by convincing judges to reject traditional notions of
sovereignty and become key participants in the construction of a new global
system.4 As one commentator put in it in 2004, "[e]ventually, and possibly
sooner than we think, the nature and path of American constitutional
development will be radically altered." 5 That was the plan anyway. What
was not planned was the domestic backlash against comparativism. That
backlash was swift and immediate. In the weeks and months following
Lawrence v. Texas6 and Roper,7 proponents of constitutional comparativism
were challenged like never before. Just days after Roper was decided,
Sarah Cleveland, a strong advocate of constitutional comparativism,
approached Justice Sandra Day O'Connor at a cocktail party to praise her
for embracing this new trend. Justice O'Connor responded rather sharply,
"Well, it certainly has gotten us into a lot of trouble!"8 Trouble indeed.
Academics loudly and repeatedly admonished the justices for being sloppy,
selective, disingenuous, and antidemocratic. 9 Leaders from the judicial,
executive, and political branches joined in the chorus of condemnation. 10
4. Ken I. Kersch, Multilateralism Comes to the Courts, PUB. INT., Winter 2004, at 3, 5.
5. Id. at 16.
6. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). In Lawrence, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a Texas statute
"making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual
conduct was unconstitutional" because it impinged on their "exercise of liberty interests
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 558. In the
majority opinion, Justice Anthony Kennedy asserted that the right to sexual freedom "has
been accepted as an integral part of human freedom in many other countries" and cited
European law, including a decision of the European Court of Human Rights, to support the
Court's holding. Id. at 573, 577; see also Roger P. Alford, Federal Courts, International
Tribunals, and the Continuum of Deference: A Postscript on Lawrence v. Texas, 44 VA. J.
INT'L L. 913, 915 (2004) ("For the first time in history, a majority of the Supreme Court has
relied on an international tribunal decision to interpret individual liberties embodied in the
U.S. Constitution.").
7. 543 U.S. 551 (citing to foreign and international sources to support the conclusion
that the juvenile death penalty constitutes "cruel and unusual punishment" under the Eighth
Amendment).
8. Posting of Roger Alford to Opinio Juris, Quotable Quotes from the Fordham Law
Review Symposium, http://opiniojuris.org/2007/10/08/quotable-quotes-from-the-fordham-
law-review-symposium/ (Oct. 8, 2007, 11:56 EDT) (quoting Sarah Cleveland's description
of her interaction with Justice O'Connor).
9. For a summary of these different criticisms, see Roger Alford, Four Mistakes in the
Debate on "Outsourcing Authority, " 69 ALB. L. REv. 653, 659-63 (2006).
10. See, e.g., H.R. Res. 97, 109th Cong. (2005); S. Res. 92, 109th Cong. (2005)
(proposed congressional resolutions condemning the use of "foreign judgments, laws, or
pronouncements" by the courts in determining the meaning of the Constitution); Diarmuid F.
O'Scannlain, U.S. Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, What Role
Should Foreign Practice and Precedent Play in the Interpretation of Domestic Law? (Oct. 11,
2004), in 80 NOTPE DAME L. REv. 1893, 1898-1900 (2005) (explaining how "recent
examples of comparative constitutionalism in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence have drawn
[Vol. 77
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During their confirmation hearings, Supreme Court nominees John Roberts
and Samuel Alito expressed their firm opposition to the interpretive
approach.'1  Original leaders of the movement now sound more defensive
than ever, as demonstrated by Justice John Paul Stevens's statement from
the bench conceding that, "I know it is not popular to refer to international
commentary on issues like this ...."12
This backlash has severely dampened the enthusiasm for constitutional
comparativism. Since Roper, the Supreme Court has been conspicuously
silent on the subject and has repeatedly rejected opportunities to rely on
international and comparative material in constitutional cases. Despite
deciding over fifty constitutional cases since Roper, the Supreme Court has
not once relied on contemporary foreign or international law and practice to
interpret constitutional provisions. This is notwithstanding the obvious
opportunities to do so in contexts such as abortion,' 3 free speech, 14 free
exercise of religion, 15 due process, 16 equal protection, 17 and the death
harsh responses from adherents to the traditional view that American courts should place
exclusive reliance upon domestic sources of law"); The Relevance of Foreign Legal
Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases: A Conversation Between Justice Antonin Scalia and
Justice Stephen Breyer, 3 INT'L J. CONST. L. 519 (2005); Alberto R. Gonzales, U.S. Attorney
Gen., Prepared Remarks of Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales at the University of
Chicago Law School (Nov. 9, 2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/
speeches/2005/ag-speech_0511092.html (criticizing the use of constitutional comparativism
by arguing that reliance on foreign authority undermines the Court's legitimacy, usurps the
role of the political branches, and creates serious advocacy problems for litigators appearing
before the court).
11. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief
Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.
201 (2005) (expressing concern about the use of foreign law as precedent and arguing that, if
you use foreign law, "you can find anything you want"); see also Confirmation Hearing on
the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 370-71 (2006)
(expressing his belief that foreign law is not helpful in interpreting the Constitution and
arguing that, because the United States was one of the first and foremost to develop
individuals' rights, judges should only look to United States precedent in interpreting the Bill
of Rights).
12. Transcript of Oral Argument at 41, Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008)
(No. 07-343) (referencing an amicus brief filed by the English law lords "discussing the
international principle that nations that retain the death penalty may not extend the death
penalty to crimes to which it does not presently apply").
13. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1619 (2007) (considering the "validity of the
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 . . . ,a federal statute regulating abortion procedures"
(citation omitted)).
14. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2630 (2007) (addressing whether a public
school's prohibition of speech advocating illegal drug use violates a student's First
Amendment rights).
15. McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (discussing whether a county's
posting of the Ten Commandments at courthouses violates the First Amendment).
16. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007) (addressing whether an
award of punitive damages, based in part on a jury's desire to punish defendant for harm
caused to nonparties, amounts to a taking of property from defendant without due process).
17. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007)
(determining whether a school district's decision to adopt "student assignment plans that rely
2008]
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penalty. 18 The Supreme Court's silence on this issue is deafening. The
only notable examples of constitutional comparativism since Roper have
been in the Second Amendment case of District of Columbia v. Heller19 and
the Guantdnamo habeas corpus case of Boumediene v. Bush.20 Of course,
in both those cases the approach adopted was of the variety Justice Antonin
Scalia advocates: historical comparisons used to understand the original
meaning of constitutional text.21
While the Supreme Court's enthusiasm for constitutional comparativism
has waxed and now waned, lower state and federal courts have remained
resolutely agnostic about this new movement. By any measure, the effort to
encourage inferior state and federal courts to embrace constitutional
comparativism has been an abject failure. This is of tremendous practical
significance because over ninety-nine percent of all cases are resolved by
lower state and federal courts. 22 "[A]lthough the United States Supreme
Court is technically the final word on federal law and cases," as a practical
matter, lower courts are "the courts of last resort for most litigants and the
upon race to determine which public school certain children may attend" violates the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection).
18. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2646, 2649-65 (2008) (considering whether
imposing the death penalty for the crime of raping a child violates the Eighth Amendment
"where the crime did not result, and was not intended to result, in death of the victim"); Baze
v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1532 (2008) (discussing whether "a State's refusal to change its
method [of execution] can be viewed as 'cruel and unusual' under the Eighth Amendment" if
it "rejects an alternative method that is 'feasible' and 'readily available' and would
'significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain,"' absent a "legitimate penological
justification").
19. 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2797 (2008) (deciding whether the Second Amendment protects an
individual right to possess firearms and whether the city's ban on handguns violated that
right by considering English law in interpreting the meaning of the text of the Second
Amendment).
20. 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2245-46 (2008) (discussing the origin of the writ of habeas corpus
in English law in order to determine whether detention of aliens designated as enemy
combatants have the constitutional privilege of habeas corpus).
21. See Roger P. Alford, In Search of a Theory for Constitutional Comparativism, 52
UCLA L. REv. 639, 655 (2005) ("Whether interpreting a constitution, treaty or statute,
Justice Scalia seeks to understand original meaning. Accordingly, in interpreting a modem
treaty, Justice Scalia will not hesitate to examine contemporary judicial decisions in Britain
and Australia because, in his view, '[f]oreign constructions are evidence of the original
shared understanding of the contracting parties."' (quoting Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540
U.S. 644, 660 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting))).
22. See Richard Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term-Foreword: A Political Court,
119 HARV. L. REV. 32, 36 (2005) ("If one assumes, very conservatively, that the total number
of decisions reviewable by the Supreme Court was at least 75,000 in 2003 (remember that
there were more than 55,000 federal appellate decisions alone that year), then since certiorari
was granted in only 87 cases, the percentage of final decisions potentially eligible for review
that the Supreme Court did review was only 0.12%." (citing The Supreme Court, 2003
Term-The Statistics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 497, 505 (2004))); Tracey E. George & Michael E.
Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of United States Courts of Appeals En Banc, 9 SuP.
CT. ECON. REV. 171, 171 (2001) ("The Rehnquist Court has granted certiorari to less than




sources of doctrinal development for most legal issues. '23 Accordingly, if
lower courts eschew constitutional comparativism, then this constitutes the
rejection of a comparative interpretive methodology in virtually all cases.
I. STATE SUPREME COURTS
In considering all the state and federal courts below the Supreme Court, it
could be expected that state supreme courts would be the most comfortable
in relying on constitutional comparativism. State supreme courts are the
final arbiter of the content of state constitutional rights and have experience
using decisions of the Supreme Court and sister state supreme courts for
persuasive authority in interpreting state constitutional guarantees. It was,
after all, the Missouri Supreme Court in Simmons v. Roper that attached
significance to comparative experiences before the U.S. Supreme Court's
ringing endorsement of the practice on appeal.24 But the expectation that
state supreme courts would rely on comparative constitutionalism has not
been borne out by recent experience.
There have been over 3500 decisions rendered in constitutional cases in
state supreme courts since Roper was decided on March 1, 2005.25 Of
those decisions, only forty make any reference to Roper at all, and of these,
only six make any reference to foreign or international law. That is less
than one percent of all state supreme court constitutional cases decided
since March 1, 2005. Incorporating references to Lawrence does not
appreciably change the results, with the number reaching twenty
constitutional cases, which is still well below the one percent threshold.
From a quantitative perspective, the highest courts of our fifty states are
utterly disinterested in constitutional comparativism.
If one examines the handful of state supreme court cases that reference
Roper and/or Lawrence's reliance on foreign or international law, the
results are even more depressing for comparativists. For the state supreme
court constitutional cases that reference Roper, not a single case has relied
on constitutional comparativism to strike down a law or overturn a
conviction. One state supreme court acknowledged the Supreme Court's
reliance on international law in Roper, but declined to rely on international
23. Tracey E. George, Developing a Positive Theory of Decisionmaking on U.S. Courts
ofAppeals, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1635, 1636 (1998).
24. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 402 (Mo. 2003) (en banc), affd, 543 U.S. 551
(2005).
25. Roper, 543 U.S. 551. This number includes all state supreme courts, the New York
Court of Appeals, as well as the Texas and Oklahoma Courts of Criminal Appeal. The
search terms used to reach this number were the following: Allstates library, To(92) &
date(aft 3/1/2005 & bef 6/15/2008) & pr("supreme court") & "Roper v. Simmons" &
"international" "foreign," plus Ny-cs library, To(92) & date(aft 3/1/2005 & bef 6/15/2008) &
pr("court of appeals") & "Roper v. Simmons" & "international" "foreign," plus TX-cs
library, To(92) & date(aft 3/1/2005 & bef 6/15/2008) & pr("court of criminal appeals") &
"Roper v. Simmons" & "international" "foreign," plus OK-cs library, To(92) & date(aft
3/1/2005 & bef 6/15/2008) & pr("court of criminal appeals") & "Roper v. Simmons" &
"international" "foreign."
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law when the question presented was whether someone who was eighteen at
the time he committed the murders should be spared from the death
penalty. 26 In two other state supreme court decisions, the courts refused to
consider comparative material in the absence of a national consensus
against the death penalty.27 The Supreme Court of California expressed the
reasoning supporting this national consensus requirement succinctly:
"Although the practices and norms of other nations can be relevant in
determining whether a punishment is cruel and unusual under the Eighth
Amendment, they are not controlling. What matters are the standards of
decency of the American people." 28  Arguably the best candidate for
recourse to constitutional comparison since Roper was the case of State v.
Kennedy, where a man was sentenced to death for the aggravated rape of a
child.29 In that case, the Louisiana Supreme Court acknowledged the use
and endorsement of foreign law by the Supreme Court in Roper, but
completely ignored this methodology in its own analysis of the issue. 30
To the extent state supreme court judges have opined on Roper's
recourse to international and foreign law in interpreting constitutional
protections, those opinions have been negative. The most eloquent example
of this view came from Chief Judge Michael Heavican of the Nebraska
Supreme Court. In State v. Mata, he argued that reliance on conventional
standards of decency invites judges to inject subjective values into their
decisions, and that reliance on foreign law should be a matter left to the
legislative branches: 31
[A]ll pretense of state or federal constitutional interpretation is lost the
moment a judge looks to foreign law. Roper shows that a concern with
contemporary standards of decency will inevitably lead to reliance on
26. Jordan v. State, 918 So. 2d 636, 656 (Miss. 2005). The court distinguished Jordan v.
State from Roper based on the ages of the respective defendants, because unlike the
defendant in Roper, Kelvin Jordan was eighteen years of age at the time of the murders. Id.
After establishing grounds for differentiating Jordan from Roper, the Mississippi Supreme
Court declined to "rely on international laws, covenants and treaties in determining whether
the death penalty is appropriate." Id. at 656.
27. People v. Blair, 115 P.3d 1145, 1189 (Cal. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1107 (2006)
("Eighth Amendment analysis instead hinges upon whether there is a national consensus in
this country against a particular punishment." (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 562-66)); People v.
Kennedy, 115 P.3d 472, 504 (Cal. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1076 (2006) ("Whether a
form of punishment is cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment is determined based
on an evaluation of evolving standards of decency." (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
100-01 (1958))).
28. Kennedy, 115 P.3d at 504-05 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 575).
29. State v. Kennedy, 957 So. 2d 757 (La. 2007), reh'g denied, No. 98-1425, 2003 WL
25278316 (La. Dist. Ct. Oct. 2, 2003), rev'd, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008). The Supreme Court of
Louisiana affirmed the defendant's conviction and sentence to death. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct.
2641. Upon grant of certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits the state "from imposing the death penalty for the rape of a child
where the crime did not result, and was not intended to result, in death of the victim." Id. at
2646.
30. Kennedy, 957 So. 2d at 783-84 n.30.
31. State v. Mata, 745 N.W.2d 229, 288-90 (Heavican, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), cert. denied, No. 08-5204, 2008 WL 2753427 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2008).
[Vol. 77
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foreign law. After all, although our nation has a unique experience with
constitutional interpretation, we have no monopoly on humanity.
Of course, it would be naive to assume that the influence of foreign
law will always result in an "expansion" of personal liberties ....
Therefore, the specter that judges will rely on foreign law when
interpreting our state and federal Constitutions is a broad-based
concern.32
The curtailment rather than expansion of individual liberties is precisely
what occurred in the case of State v. Romano.33 In Romano, the Hawaii
Supreme Court addressed a claim that prostitution laws were an
unconstitutional invasion of privacy. 34 The Hawaii Supreme Court held
that there was a rational basis for prostitution laws and noted that there is a
general consensus in the international community against the practice of
prostitution. 35 The court cited two international treaties in support of the
proposition that countries take all appropriate measures to suppress the
exploitation and prostitution of women.36 The Romano decision is the
latest example of how courts have relied on comparative experiences to
curtail individual liberties. Thus, even in those extremely rare instances
when a state court does rely on international or foreign law, it often does so
to uphold government restrictions on private conduct.37
Finally, in State v. Roque, the Supreme Court of Arizona addressed the
issue in the bizarre context in which the defendant argued it was
constitutionally impermissible for a prosecutor to consult foreign opinion in
seeking the death penalty.38 On September 12, 2001, one day after the
terrorist attacks on the United States, defendant Frank Roque declared his
intent to "shoot some 'rag heads."' 39 A few days later Roque murdered a
Sikh of Indian descent. 40 In Arizona, the state may seek the death penalty if
it can prove the defendant committed aggravated first degree murder.41
Therefore, in seeking the death penalty, prosecutors consulted with the
Indian government to help determine if the murder was aggravated based on
the race, ethnic background, or religion of the victim.42 Defendant argued
that such consultations with foreign officials were unconstitutional. 43 The
32. Id. at 288-89.
33. 155 P.3d 1102 (Haw. 2007).
34. Id. at 1109-15.
35. Id. at 1114n.14.
36. Id. (citing Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; Convention for the
Suppression of the Traffic in Person and the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, Dec.
2, 1949, 96 U.N.T.S. 271).
37. See Alford, supra note 9, at 675.
38. State v. Roque, 141 P.3d 368, 401-02 (Ariz. 2006) (en banc).
39. Id. at 377.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 402 (citing ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (2001)).
42. Id. at401.
43. Id. at 402.
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Arizona Supreme Court rejected the challenge, finding that the defendant
made
no effective argument that a state may not consider the views of the
government of a foreign country with respect to the murder of someone
born there. Because the State has wide discretion in deciding whether to
seek a death sentence and had a legitimate reason to seek the penalty in
this case, the State did not violate the Eighth Amendment or the
Fourteenth Amendment by consulting with the Indian government. 44
The cases that rely on Lawrence also offer little hope for comparativists.
This is most aptly illustrated in the California Supreme Court's recent gay
marriage case.4 5 In order to strike down California's same-sex marriage
laws under state equal protection grounds, the court had to reject the state's
reliance on traditional practices in the United States and the world. The
court noted that only six jurisdictions in the world-Massachusetts and five
foreign nations (Canada, South Africa, the Netherlands, Belgium, and
Spain)-authorize same-sex marriage. 46 Thus, ninety-eight percent of the
countries of the world continue the traditional approach of only allowing
marriage between couples of the opposite sex. In justifying the rejection of
the practices of the overwhelming majority of the world, the court made the
following argument:
In defending the state's proffered interest in retaining the traditional
definition of marriage as limited to a union between a man and a woman,
the Attorney General and the Governor rely primarily upon the historic
and well-established nature of this limitation and the circumstance that the
designation of marriage continues to apply only to a relationship between
opposite-sex couples in the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions in the
United States and around the world. Because, until recently, there has
been widespread societal disapproval and disparagement of
homosexuality in many cultures, it is hardly surprising that the institution
of civil marriage generally has been limited to opposite-sex couples and
that many persons have considered the designation of marriage to be
appropriately applied only to a relationship of an opposite-sex couple.
Although the understanding of marriage as limited to a union of a man
and a woman is undeniably the predominant one, if we have learned
anything from the significant evolution in the prevailing societal views
and official policies toward members of minority races and toward
women over the past half-century, it is that even the most familiar and
generally accepted of social practices and traditions often mask an
unfairness and inequality that frequently is not recognized or appreciated
by those not directly harmed by those practices or traditions .... [T]he
interest in retaining a tradition that excludes an historically disfavored
minority group from a status that is extended to all others--even when the
tradition is long-standing and widely shared--does not necessarily
44. Id.
45. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
46. Id. at 450-51 n.70.
[Vol. 77
CONSTITUTIONAL COMPARA TIVISM
represent a compelling state interest for purposes of equal protection
analysis.47
In other words, longstanding and widespread comparative experiences
should be rejected when they are thought to mask unfairness and inequality.
Contrast this with the Supreme Court's reliance on comparative experiences
in Lawrence, where the Court emphasized that "[t]he right the petitioners
seek in this case has been accepted as an integral part of human freedom in
many other countries." 4 8  Or contrast this with the Court's language in
Roper that "[t]he opinion of the world community, while not controlling our
outcome, does provide respected and significant confirmation for our own
conclusions." 4 9  The California Supreme Court case illustrates that
comparativism is of little value when a court chooses to be at the forefront
of a social movement. It is one thing for constitutional comparativists to
argue-as they did in Lawrence and Roper-that our "aberrant" practices
should fall into line with the prevailing views of the rest of the world. But
it is quite another thing when advocates argue that we should be at the
cutting edge of a new social movement. 50 With the former approach,
comparativism is a tailwind that moves the ship with the prevailing winds;
with the latter approach, comparativism is an anchor that prevents the ship
from moving from its present position.5 1 In either case, any court choosing
to adopt a post hoc utilitarian approach can readily find excuses to rely on
or reject this interpretive methodology as expediency requires.
The point of this brief foray into state supreme court jurisprudence is to
underscore that even in those extremely rare moments when state supreme
courts do rely on comparative material in deciding constitutional cases, the
results are anything but hopeful for comparativists. The overwhelming
posture of state supreme courts toward constitutional comparativism is
disinterest. Less than one percent of all constitutional cases decided by
47. Id. at 450-51 (footnotes omitted).
48. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003).
49. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
50. For example, in a recent gay marriage case in Arizona, petitioners cited to growing
international recognition of same-sex marriage or unions, but the Arizona Supreme Court
concluded that, "[a]lthough same-sex relationships are more open and have garnered greater
societal acceptance in recent years, same-sex marriages are neither deeply rooted in the legal
and social history of our Nation or state nor are they implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty." Standhardt v. Superior Court of Ariz., 77 P.3d 451, 459 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).
51. See Posting of Roger Alford to Opinio Juris, Gay Marriage and Constitutional
Comparativism, http://opiniojuris.org/2006/07/27/gay-marriage-and-constitutional-comparativism/
(July 27, 2006, 13:22 EDT). It is worth noting that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court and the California Supreme Court both rely on two Canadian cases in support of their
holdings that same-sex marriage laws are unconstitutional. See Standhardt, 77 P.3d at 459
n. 11 ("Courts in two Canadian provinces recently declared that confinement of marriage to
opposite-sex couples violates the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms."); Marriage
Cases, 183 P.3d at 442-43; Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 966 n.31,
969 (Mass. 2003). But the fact that both state supreme courts rely on Canadian cases in
support of their argument does not belie the fact that in so doing they are rejecting the
practices of the overwhelming majority of other countries in the world. California does so
explicitly, while Massachusetts does so without admission.
20081
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state supreme courts rely on constitutional comparativism. 52  In those
occasional instances when they recognize the Supreme Court's embrace of
comparativism, they almost always refuse to join the embrace.
,II. FEDERAL COURTS
Both the federal appeals and district courts have proven even less
receptive to constitutional comparativism than state supreme courts. Since
Roper was decided, the federal courts of appeals have decided 5200
constitutional cases. Of those cases, less than one percent cited either
Lawrence's or Roper's reliance on international or foreign experiences. 53
During that same period, federal district courts have decided 3300
constitutional cases and, again, less than one percent made any reference to
either Lawrence's or Roper's use of comparative material. 54
As for federal appeals courts, there are few significant cases addressing
the subject of constitutional comparativism since Roper.55 One of the most
significant is the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit case of Allen
v. Ornoski,56 a case in which the defendant argued that the Eighth
Amendment prohibited execution of the aged and infirm.57 Clarence Ray
Allen reasoned that execution of the elderly does not comport with evolving
standards of decency in that it violates, among other things, norms of
domestic and international law.58 In a footnote, the Ninth Circuit rejected
this argument, concluding that, "[w]hile international norms may also be
instructive in this analysis, in light of the nonexistence of domestic
authority supporting Allen's claim, and the lack of definitive international
authority provided by Allen, we, as an intermediate court, decline to
consider the asserted practices of foreign jurisdictions." 59 In some respects
this conclusion seems unremarkable. The absence of a national consensus
obviates any need to rely on international opinion to support such a
consensus. 60 And the absence of any international consensus suggests that
whatever benefit one might otherwise enjoy from comparative references
52. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
53. The search terms used to reach this number were the following: CAP library, To(92)
& date(aft 3/1/2005 & bef 6/15/2008) & "Lawrence v. Texas" "Roper v. Simmons" &
"international law" "foreign law" "international norms" "foreign norms."
54. The search terms used to reach this number were the following: DCT library,
To(92) & date(aft 3/1/2005 & bef 6/15/2008) & "Lawrence v. Texas" "Roper v. Simmons"
& "international law" "foreign law" "international norms" "foreign norms."
55. Most of the lower federal courts' experience with constitutional comparativism
involves one party referencing foreign material and the court refusing to consider it in their
analysis. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Gonzales, 247 F. App'x 782, 786 (6th Cir. 2007); United
States v. McClure, 241 F. App'x 105, 107 (4th Cir. 2007); Allen v. Ornoski, 435 F.3d 946,
952 n.8 (9th Cir. 2006); Gordon v. Mule, 153 F. App'x 39, 40 (2d Cir. 2005).
56. 435 F.3d at 946.
57. Id. at 954.
58. Id. at 952.
59. Id. at 952 n.8.
60. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 604-05 (2005) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources to Interpret the Constitution,
98 AM. J. INT'L L. 57, 58 (2004).
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would not apply with respect to the question presented. But the conclusion
is significant in that it suggests that a federal appellate court believed that
there are reasons unique to its status as a lower court to be cautious about
relying upon appeals to constitutional comparativism.
As for federal district courts, there are two decisions that are particularly
significant examples of constitutional comparativism. The first is Khouzam
v. Hogan which concerns due process violations and extraordinary rendition
to Egypt.61 Sameh Sami Khouzam argued that his deportation to Egypt
would result in torture there and that this violated his constitutional rights. 62
The district court focused on Khouzam's right to be free from torture and
the constitutional requirement that "the Government cannot return an alien
to a country where there is a likelihood he will be tortured without affording
the alien an opportunity to be heard. '63 The court then surveyed the
practices of other countries in securing diplomatic assurances against
torture from the receiving country before deporting the alien to that
country. 64 The district court cited expert opinions that "Austria, Canada,
Germany, Netherlands, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the
United Kingdom, all parties to [the Convention Against Torture], provide
for judicial review of the reliability and sufficiency of diplomatic
assurances." 65 The district court then cited Lawrence and Roper for the
proposition that, "[a]lthough the opinions of international tribunals and
courts of other countries have no binding effect in the United States, they
are nonetheless often viewed as relevant in determining whether certain
action in the United States violates fundamental interests. '66
The other significant federal district court case involving constitutional
comparativism was Thomas v. Baca.67 Thomas addressed the question of
whether "floor-sleeping" due to prison overcrowding violated the inmate's
Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment. 68 The
district court concluded that forcing inmates to sleep on the floor due to
prison overcrowding rose to the level of a constitutional violation.69 The
court then argued that,
International guidelines support this basic right. . . . For example, the
United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners
• . . provide that "[e]very prisoner shall, in accordance with local or
national standards, be provided with a separate bed, and with separate and
61. Khouzam v. Hogan, 529 F. Supp. 2d 543 (M.D. Pa. 2008).
62. Id. at 547.
63. Id. at 565.
64. Id. at 565-66.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 566.
67. 514 F. Supp. 2d 1201 (C.D. Cal. 2007).
68. Id. at 1205 n.1.
69. Id. at 1219.
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sufficient bedding which shall be clean when issued, kept in good order
and changed often enough to ensure its cleanliness." 70
These two cases represent vastly different examples of constitutional
comparativism. Khouzam represents a carefully drafted analysis of the due
process rights of aliens applied to the difficult question of what diplomatic
assurances regarding torture must be secured before an alien is deported.
The court examined the experiences and case law in numerous other
countries and, combined with extensive analysis of our own due process
jurisprudence, reached the conclusion that the United States must afford
minimum due process rights to aliens facing the specter of torture if
deported. 7 1
Thomas, by contrast, is among the worst possible examples of
constitutional comparativism. The court does not purport to consider or
analyze international or foreign law or practice. It could not do so, of
course, and find support for a constitutional violation for the conduct at
issue. So instead, the district court referenced the international guidelines
adopted by the United Nations Economic and Social Council and gave
those guidelines constitutional significance. 72 This is notwithstanding the
fact that the guidelines themselves expressly disclaim that they are legally
binding. 73  Thus, Thomas conspicuously highlights the dangers of
constitutional comparativism, which empowers judges to scan the
international horizon for any possible authority to interpret constitutional
guarantees. The international guidelines are not a treaty. They do not
reflect customary international law,74  but through the magic of
70. Id. at 1217-18 (quoting United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for Treatment of
Prisoners, E.S.C. Res. 663 C (XXIV), 19, U.N. Doc. E/3048 (July 31, 1957) (amended
May 13, 1977)).
71. See Khouzam, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 564.
72. Thomas, 514 F. Supp. 2dat 1217-18.
73. See E.S.C. Res. 663 C (XXIV), supra note 70, 19. The guidelines state that,
In view of the great variety of legal, social, economic and geographical conditions
of the world, it is evident that not all of the rules are capable of application in all
places and at all times. They should, however, serve to stimulate a constant
endeavor to overcome practical difficulties in the way of their application, in the
knowledge that they represent, as a whole, the minimum conditions which are
accepted as suitable by the United Nations.
Id.
74. See Suzanne M. Bernard, An Eye for an Eye: The Current Status of International
Law on the Humane Treatment of Prisoners, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 759, 785-86 (1994) ("A
determination that a customary norm has evolved with respect to the standards for the
treatment of prisoners depends, in large part, on how one defines 'humane treatment.' While
some aspects pertaining to the treatment of prisoners have quite clearly evolved into
international customary law, others are far from the level of general acceptance, and may
never achieve customary status. If 'humane treatment' means freedom from torture, then
there is already near-universal recognition of a binding norm of international law. However,
once the definition of 'humane treatment' is expanded to include a prohibition on 'cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment,' the status as customary international law is less clear.
And if 'humane treatment' includes the right to a library, a single cell, or dental services,
which are among the numerous Standard Minimum Rules, then it most certainly has not
been generally accepted as a binding norm." (footnotes omitted)).
[Vol. 77
CONSTITUTIONAL COMPARA TIVISM
constitutional comparativism, they have now become grafted into what is
required under our Constitution. Prisoners' rights to recreation, physical
exercise, cultural activities, education, dental hygiene, and libraries are all
among the other recommendations in the international guidelines waiting to
be anointed as constitutional guarantees. 75
The experience in federal courts since Roper regarding constitutional
comparativism reflects an attitude of pervasive disinterest. Federal courts
almost never decide constitutional cases by incorporating some analysis of
international and foreign law or experience. In some cases, as with Allen,
the court is expressly invited to engage in comparativism but declines the
invitation. In rare cases, as with Khouzam and Thomas, federal courts
engage in constitutional comparativism with decidedly mixed results,
underscoring the promise and the peril of this interpretive methodology.
III. DECONSTRUCTING LOWER COURT DISINTEREST
Few, if any, comparative scholars will challenge the proposition that,
since Roper, lower courts have displayed almost no interest in constitutional
comparativism. But this disinterest is masked by the breathless scholarly
fixation on the subject. Indeed, for every lower court reference to
Lawrence's or Roper's recourse to constitutional comparativism there are
dozens of law review articles on the subject. 76 You would never know it if
you spent all your time reading secondary instead of primary sources, but
the project of "bring[ing] international law home" 77 at the retail level of
lower courts has been an abject failure.
While few will challenge the empirical conclusion that lower courts have
declined the invitation to embrace constitutional comparativism, one
suspects that scholars will differ sharply when it comes to deconstructing
lower court disinterest. There are several possible explanations for the
lower courts' current posture toward constitutional comparativism. None of
these rationales can be established with any certainty, but they each are
plausible explanations.
A. Insufficient Time for Adoption
One possible explanation for lower court disinterest is premised on the
notion that the movement of constitutional comparativism is a new
phenomenon and it is simply too early to tell whether they will embrace it.
As one who espouses the view that the current wave of constitutional
comparativism really is a new phenomenon, I am sympathetic to this
argument. 78 But there are two reasons to reject this argument. First, this
75. See E.S.C. Res. 663 C (XXIV), supra note 70, 21, 22, 40, 77, 78.
76. There have been over 1269 articles published in the Westlaw JLR database with the
search query "Roper v. Simmons" "Lawrence v. Texas" & "International Law"
"International Norms" "Foreign Law" "Foreign Norms."
77. Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Human
Rights Home (Apr. 8, 1998), in 35 Hous. L. REv. 623, 642 (1998).
78. See Alford, supra note 9, at 667.
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argument is of little value for proponents of comparativism. In order to
underscore the legitimacy of this approach, comparative advocates have
long argued that this interpretive methodology is not new but rather reflects
a long and well-established tradition. 79 Those who argue that there is
nothing new to comparativism will be at pains to argue that it is too early to
assess whether lower courts will embrace this approach. If this
methodology has a long tradition, it is a tradition of general and pervasive
disuse. It is a bit like the tradition of Groundhog Day: we are told it
happens, but we almost never see it happening. One cannot argue for the
historical pedigree of this methodology and also maintain that it is too early
to tell whether lower courts will adopt this approach.
Second, even if constitutional comparativism is a new phenomenon, the
movement crystallized almost five years ago with the Supreme Court's
decisions in Lawrence and Roper. Those momentous decisions sparked a
tremendous amount of commentary at the bar, the bench, and the academy.
If lower courts wished to seize the opportunity and follow in the path of
those decisions, they have had more than enough opportunity to familiarize
themselves with the debate and act upon it. Thus, this rationale, while
plausible, is not a particularly convincing explanation for lower court
disinterest in comparativism.
B. Institutional Legitimacy
A better explanation for why lower courts have been reluctant to embrace
this interpretive methodology is because of concerns for institutional
legitimacy. The backlash against Lawrence and Roper has been so intense
that the Supreme Court has walked away from its earlier position. Lower
courts undoubtedly share the same concern for institutional legitimacy as
the Supreme Court. It is likely that courts balance the potential institutional
costs of embracing this approach with the potential benefits and conclude
that, in the overwhelming majority of cases, the costs outweigh the benefits.
The Ninth Circuit in Allen appeared to be voicing this concern when it
stated that intermediate courts should decline the invitation to rely on
foreign authority. 80 I recently had a conversation with one Ninth Circuit
judge who expressed great caution about relying on any persuasive
authority, much less authority from outside the United States. Most
79. See, e.g., Sarah Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 5-
6 (2006) ("A broader view of U.S. constitutional history, however, indicates that
international law has always played a substantial, even dominant, role in broad segments of
U.S. constitutional jurisprudence."); Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our
Law, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 43, 45 (2004) ("From the beginning, then, American courts regularly
took judicial notice of both international law and foreign law (the law and practice of other
nations) when construing American law."); Vicki Jackson, Yes Please, I'd Love to Talk with
You, LEGAL AFF., July-Aug. 2004, at 43, 44, available at http://www.legalaffairs.org/
issues/July-August-2004/feature-jackson.julaug04.msp ("In many early cases, the [Supreme
Court] referred to the 'law of nations' (today called 'international law') or other countries'
practices.").
80. Allen v. Ornoski, 435 F.3d 946, 952 n.8 (9th Cir. 2006).
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constitutional cases can be resolved through the existing interpretive canons
of text, structure, history, precedent, and national experience. For those
cases that cannot, persuasive authority from other U.S. jurisdictions will
often be available. Thus, those instances in which it will be useful to rely
on comparative experiences to fill a void will be extraordinarily rare.
The Supreme Court, of course, shares this commitment to judicial
precedent but has greater freedom to depart from precedent. It is worth
noting that the three most significant instances of constitutional
comparativism in recent years-Atkins v. Virginia, Lawrence, and Roper-
were all examples of the Supreme Court reversing its own precedent. Even
assuming lower courts were sympathetic to this methodological approach
and the outcome that flowed therefrom, it is doubtful that lower courts
perceive themselves as having the same institutional freedom to depart from
precedent. Unlike the Supreme Court, lower courts will almost never rely
on foreign or international law to depart from binding Supreme Court
precedent. 81
C. Institutional Competency
A third possibility for their reluctance is that lower courts lack the
institutional competency to effectively engage in constitutional
comparativism. State and federal judges rarely have been trained to deal
with foreign or international material, either on the job or prior to joining
the bench. Constitutional comparativism is an extraordinarily difficult task
to do well, even in the best of circumstances. But when judges and their
staff lack the training, and the lawyers fail to assist them, one is not
surprised by lower courts' reluctance to employ this approach.
This concern really is another way of highlighting the cost-benefit
analysis that overwhelmingly weighs against constitutional comparativism.
Even assuming the benefits of this approach are significant (which is an
uncertain proposition), the costs of effective use of this methodology are
also extraordinarily high. These sources are never dispositive and are only
useful as persuasive authority if they are easily accessible and readily
digestible. In short, unlike almost every other type of persuasive authority,
these sources are rarely low-hanging fruit ripe for the harvest.
It is no accident that in those cases in which lower courts do rely on
comparative material, they are assisted in the task by extremely able
counsel and/or amici. The American Civil Liberties Union was counsel in
Khouzam, and Erwin Chemerinsky was counsel in Thomas. The California
Supreme Court in the gay marriage case benefited from numerous amici
and the able counsel of the Alliance Defense Fund. Obviously in the
typical case in which courts confront constitutional issues, judges do not
profit from expert amici or the most preeminent lawyers in the country.
81. The Missouri Supreme Court's decision in Roper is a notable exception. See State ex
rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397,407 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
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D. Institutional Sanctions
Another possible explanation for lower court reluctance to rely on this
methodology is that they are subject to greater institutional sanction than
the Supreme Court. State court judges in twenty-two states are elected, and
in an additional sixteen states, merit commissions are used.82 Traditionally,
it is thought that state court judges lack the same degree of independence
that federal judges with lifetime appointments enjoy.83 But federal district
and appellate court judges must consider their own institutional sanctions,
the two most important of which are the possibility of elevation to a higher
court and the specter of reversal. As a result of these institutional sanctions,
lower courts may be more hesitant to rely on constitutional comparativism,
especially given the controversy that has flowed from the Supreme Court's
reliance upon it.
Those sanctions, of course, are extreme. Softer sanctions may also
influence the decision by lower courts to decline the invitation to rely on
comparative material. The most obvious soft sanction that a lower court
faces is criticism regarding the quality or reasoning of the decision. That
criticism may come from a higher court when the decision is on appeal,
from other courts reviewing or distinguishing the decision, or from scholars
or practitioners. Criticism may have less salience if a judge is acting within
the confines of his or her core areas of competency. But given the
institutional limitations on effective engagement with comparative material,
it is quite plausible that lower court judges will exercise extreme caution in
deciding whether to venture into unfamiliar territory.
E. Lower Court Determination of Foreign Law
Another possible reason that lower courts are reluctant to adopt
comparativism, especially the quixotic and haphazard approach to it that the
Supreme Court adopted in Lawrence and Roper, is that lower courts are
accustomed to determining foreign law through the procedures set forth in
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 44.1 provides that,
82. Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Professionals or Politicians: The
Uncertain Empirical Case for an Elected Rather Than Appointed Judiciary 3 (Univ. of Chi.
Law Sch., John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 357, 2d series, 2007), available at
https://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/357.pdf ("[J]udges in 9 states run for election-and
reelection-as members of political parties. In between, there are two systems that combine
partisan and nonpartisan elements. In 16 states, merit commissions are used: typically, an
independent commission provides nominees whom the governor may appoint, while a
retention election is used at the end of a judge's term (rather than a competitive election). In
13 states, non-partisan elections are held: the public votes but judges are not permitted to
advertise themselves as members of particular political parties.").
83. Damon Cann, Beyond Accountability and Independence: Judicial Selection and
State Court Performance, 90 JUDICATURE 226 (2007); see also Aman L. McLeod, A
Comparison of the Criminal Appellate Decisions of Appointed State Supreme Courts:




A party who intends to raise an issue about a foreign country's law must
give notice by a pleading or other writing. In determining foreign law, the
court may consider any relevant material or source, including testimony,
whether or not submitted by a party or admissible under the Federal Rules
of Evidence. The court's determination must be treated as a ruling on a
question of law.8
4
In other words, lower courts often encounter situations in which foreign law
is the governing law, and in those situations their approach to determining
the content of that law is highly refined, systematic, and careful. Lower
courts, especially at the trial level, will be quite reluctant to rely on foreign
law if the parties to the dispute have not been given proper notice of its
intent to do so. Lower courts' determination of foreign law under rule 44
typically allows both parties to brief the issue, permits written submissions
by foreign law experts appointed by the parties or the court, and sometimes
includes oral testimony on the content of foreign law.8 5 One would expect
that this procedure acculturates federal judges to treat foreign law with great
care, and not haphazardly select cases from the global corpus that support a
particular result.
F. Inputs and Outcomes
Another possible rationale for lower court reluctance to rely on
comparative experiences relates to inputs and outcomes. Judges from the
left and the right will only use this approach if the methodological input and
the practical outcome are both acceptable. Conservative judges are unlikely
to utilize this approach because of fidelity to the particular philosophy of
judicial restraint. In many respects, comparisons of contemporary foreign
and international law are simply the latest variation of a longstanding
tradition of living constitutionalism. Thus, even if the outcome may be a
result they desire, as is likely the case on numerous issues, 86 conservative
judges will be reluctant to engage in a methodology that does not comport
with their notions of the judicial function. For many conservative judges,
the refusal to adopt this approach often may be a matter of right result, but
wrong method.
By contrast, liberal judges are more likely to find this interpretive
approach consistent with their judicial philosophy, but they often will not
rely on it because the results that flow from such comparisons will not be
consistent with their preferred outcome. The California Supreme Court's
gay marriage case arguably is one such example of judges rejecting
comparativism for this reason. 87 Justice Stephen Breyer's rejection of
pragmatic comparativism in the recent Second Amendment case, Heller,
84. FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1.
85. See Peter D. Trooboff, Proving Foreign Law, NAT'L L.J. Sept. 18, 2006, at 13.
86. Roger P. Alford, Roper v. Simmons and Our Constitution in International
Equipoise, 53 UCLA L. REv. 1, 25 (2005).
87. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
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arguably is another example.8 8 Because experiences from abroad often
reflect lesser, rather than greater, commitment to civil liberties, this
methodological approach provides no guarantee that it will support the
expansion of human rights in this country. For many liberal judges, the
refusal to adopt this approach often may be a matter of right method, but
wrong result.
CONCLUSION
Despite the tremendous academic interest in the subject, scholars
typically have ignored the question of what role, if any, lower courts should
play with respect to constitutional comparativism. This is surprising,
because as a practical matter, the Supreme Court can do little to bring
international law home at the retail level. If proponents of constitutional
comparativism have serious aspirations of internalizing international norms
into constitutional jurisprudence, greater focus must be given to the issue of
lower courts' disinterest in this interpretive methodology.
A few scholars have addressed the issue of the role of lower courts in
adopting this methodology. David Fontana, for example, has argued that
trial and appellate court judges should use comparative material, especially
when the American sources do not provide a clear factual or legal answer to
a question the judge must answer. "Within the framework of a trial or
appeal, a judge should encourage litigants to argue comparative
constitutional law to courts (when appropriate), sometimes even using
expert witnesses on foreign law who can help the judge determine the
relevant comparative constitutional law and its transferability." 89 Thus,
Fontana argues for a "bottom-up" approach to comparativism, with trial and
appellate courts relying on foreign sources as persuasive authority to assist
with "hard cases." 90
Vicki Jackson, by contrast, argues that engaging in comparativism
involves opportunity costs, and those costs are particularly significant with
lower courts. 91 She notes that lower courts differ from the Supreme Court
in several respects: their dockets are much broader; they have many more
cases and issues to decide; and they persistently must be concerned with
delays in the disposition of pending litigation.92 In addition, the benefits of
recourse to comparativism are fewer because in many cases there is
controlling Supreme Court authority, and the task of lower courts is simply
to follow and apply binding precedent. 93 Consequently, Professor Jackson
argues that, absent a particularly interested or knowledgeable lower court
88. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2847 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
89. David Fontana, Refined Comparativism in Constitutional Law, 49 UCLA L. REV.
539, 556 (2001).
90. See id. at 557-62.
91. VICKI JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL ERA (tentative
title, forthcoming 2009) (manuscript ch. 6, at 76-79, on file with author).
92. Id. (manuscript ch. 6, at 77).
93. Id. (manuscript ch. 6, at 76-77).
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judge, the opportunity costs of developing expertise are great and the likely
returns are low.94
While both Fontana and Jackson are proponents of constitutional
comparativism, their perspectives on lower court recourse to this
methodology differ sharply. Thus, the fact that lower courts are not relying
on comparative and international law will not be a point of significant
concern for Jackson and other scholars who share her perspective. But for
Fontana and other comparativists who take a bottom-up approach, the fact
that lower courts remain disinterested in constitutional comparativism
should be cause for serious concern. This is especially true given that the
Supreme Court also has backed away from its warm embrace of the practice
five years ago. It suggests that the project of constitutional comparativism
is fizzling and that much more work will be required simply to convince
courts to include comparative material in the interpretive canon.
From the perspective of one who is quite cautious about the merits of
constitutional comparativism, I view continued lower court disinterest with
a combination of satisfaction and relief. Comparativism works best when
undertaken by legislative or executive branch officials who are making hard
choices on issues that transcend cultures. But it is dangerous if it simply
enables judges to engage in a methodology that is exceedingly difficult to
do well and exceedingly dangerous if done poorly. Lower courts,
consciously or unconsciously, have done the calculus and concluded that
the costs of engaging in constitutional comparativism far outweigh the
benefits.
94. Id. (manuscript ch. 6, at 76-79).
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